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disproportionate number of people who are physically displaced in the context of development projects are from minority communities. Most of them
are indigenous or tribal peoples. Development-induced
displacement can give rise to severe risks for the resettled
population. Forced relocation results in the disruption of
the relationship between the relocated community and
the natural, social, economic, and cultural environments
upon which its means of livelihood are based. The loss of
a people’s base threatens the continuity of its traditions and
practices as well as endangers its cultural survival. In addition, the conditions of the new locations often imperil the
physical survival of relocated populations. The vice president
of the World Council of Indigenous Peoples underscored
the destructive consequences of the displacement of Indigenous Peoples from their land when he stated: “Next to
shooting Indigenous Peoples, the surest way to kill us is to
separate us from our part of the Earth.”
Sociologists and historians have long argued that because
of its devastating effects on both the physical and cultural
existence of dislocated people, development-induced displacement may amount to “developmental genocide,” “cultural genocide,” or “ethnocide.” Legal scholars, on the contrary, have traditionally focused on cases concerning
conflict-induced displacement, such as forced dislocations
of people that occur in conditions of armed conflict or civil
strife. Only recently, some legal scholars have begun to
evaluate forced relocations in the context of development
projects through the perspectives of international law, in particular international human rights law. Referring to forced
dislocations, Professor of Law and Development at MIT, Balakrishnan Rajagopal, has publicly raised concerns about the
practice of “ethnically targeted development,” and has
called for the international indifference toward the “violence
of development projects” to end. Rajagopal argued that the
result of development-based resettlement is often “a soft
form of genocide or crime against humanity involving systematic and deliberate destruction of ethnic, racial and
religious minorities and indigenous peoples.”
Given this recent concern about the implications of
development-induced displacement and the realization
that special legal protection must be made available, it
seems timely to determine whether the international prohibition of genocide and ethnocide can curtail developmentbased resettlement. This question is not strictly academic.
Rather, the question of whether forced relocation can
amount to genocide can be crucial in deciding whether victims of development-induced displacement have cases for
redress, in particular in courts outside their countries. For
example, if the case can be made that development-induced
displacement can under certain circumstances amount to
genocide under international law, then the victims could,
for example, seek redress in U.S. courts under the Alien
Torts Claims Act (ATCA) which grants federal district

Representatives of indigenous groups at the UN World conference against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and
Related Intolerance hold signs reading “We are peoples and not
populations” and “We are discriminated against.”

courts original jurisdiction over “any civil action by an alien
for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations
or a treaty of the United States,” even when the case involves
acts perpetrated in another country by a non-U.S. citizen.
Forced relocations in the name of development also
jeopardize the survival of the host populations inhabiting
the territories where the displaced resettle. The Qinghai
Component of the China Western Poverty Reduction project (Qinghai Project), which in 1999 and 2000 was subject
to an investigation by the World Bank’s Inspection Panel,
is exemplary. The Qinghai Project was challenged by a
Request for Inspection, inter alia, because of its severe social
effects. Under the original project design, approximately
sixty thousand ethnic Chinese were to be transferred into
the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) and the areas outside
the TAR within historical Tibet. The settler infusion would
have adversely impacted four thousand local people, including serious risk of escalation of ethnic tensions and conflicts
over resources. Concerns have been voiced that the Qinghai Project would weaken the Tibetan and Mongolian character of the area, and threaten the lifestyles and the livelihoods of the Tibetan and Mongolian “host” communities.
Protection against the Extermination of an Indigenous Group
as a Result of Development-Induced Displacement through the
Prohibition of Genocide under International Law
The definition of genocide that is most widely accepted
and generally recognized as the authoritative definition of
this crime, inclusive for purposes of customary law, is that
adopted by the United Nations through the Convention on
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
of 9 December 1948 (Genocide Convention). According to
continued on next page
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set forth in Article 2. The critical determination as to
whether forced relocation amounts to genocide is whether
Article 2 of the Convention, genocide means:
the affected community has been forcibly dislocated from
any of the following acts committed with intent to
its land with the requisite “intent” to extinguish the group.
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial
The government responsible for forcibly relocating a vulor religious group, as such:
nerable minority group will, however, rarely openly
(a) Killing members of the group;
announce that it intended resettlement to contribute to the
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to
destruction of the people dislocated. Rather, states assert that
members of the group;
the displacement and the threats it poses to the resettled
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions
group are unintentional by-products of a development proof life calculated to bring about its physical
ject with a legitimate public purpose, such as economic or
destruction in whole or in part;
social development. The argument about genocide may,
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births
therefore, collapse at this juncture.
within the group;
The argument would not collapse, however, if the Geno(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to
cide Convention’s “intent to destroy” requirement were to
another group.
be interpreted broadly, i.e., that either knowledge or a general awareness of the likely conThe forcible transfer or dislosequences of the enumerated acts
cation of a group or its adult memwith respect to the immediate vicThe critical determination as to whether
bers is not explicitly included in
tims of forced relocations would
forced relocation amounts to genocide is
the exhaustive list of acts forbidmeet this requirement. Can one,
whether the affected community has been
den under the Genocide Conhowever, convincingly argue that
vention. The Genocide Convenknowledge or foreseeability is the
forcibly dislocated from its land with the
tion does not, however, restrict
correct standard of genocidal
requisite “intent” to extinguish the group.
the manner in which the acts listed
intent? In other words, could the
in Article 2 can be committed.
forced displacement of a minority
Rather, any means of carrying out
community amount to genocide
a prohibited action with the requisite intent to destroy the
absent purpose to exterminate the peoples relocated on the
group constitutes genocide. Therefore, the forced relocagrounds of their ethnic difference or “otherness”? If the
tion of ethnic and racial minorities and indigenous groups
answer is in the affirmative, given that the effects of forced
may, for example, meet the elements of the international
resettlement, unless mitigated, are not only devastating but
crime of genocide, if the dislocation is meant to inflict on
easily foreseeable, almost any case of development-induced
the group conditions of life which can extinguish the disforced dislocation of people belonging to ethnic and racial
placed community.
minorities and indigenous groups would constitute genoNumerous cases of development-induced displacement
cide, and would therefore be curtailed by the international
of indigenous and tribal peoples, such as the forced resetprohibition of this crime.
tlement in 1981 of the Waimiri-Atroari, a native tribe living
in the state of Amazonas (Brazil), to make way for hydroThe Interpretation of Genocide as a Specific Intent Offense by
electric projects, and the forced relocation of ten thouInternational Criminal Tribunals and United States Courts
sand indigenous Kenyah and Kayan people from their
Some commentators contend that genocide embraces
ancestral homes on the island of Borneo to make way for
those acts whose foreseeable or probable consequences
the Bakun Dam, demonstrate the effects of forced relocaare the total or partial destruction of the group without any
tion. Such effects, including the deprivation of livelihood,
necessity of showing that destruction was the goal of the act.
resettlement on unproductive land, and the introduction
The stricter interpretation, according to which genocide is
of diseases, often subject the displaced populations to lifea specific intent offense, has prevailed, however. In this
threatening conditions. Genocidal acts do not necessarily
context, the case law on genocide of the International
entail the immediate destruction of a group, but can be part
Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and
of an overall plan which aims at the destruction of the
for Rwanda (ICTR), both of which have been crucial in
essential foundations of the life of a national, ethnic, racial,
defining the crime of genocide, is relevant. In The Prosecuor religious group. Hence, forced relocation into an envitor v. Radislav Krstic, the ICTY dealt in depth with the quesronment in which the security, health, dignity, and tradition of how to interpret the intent requirement. In Krstic,
tional way of living of a minority group is not secured, may
the Trial Chamber invoked the preparatory work of the
constitute genocide within the meaning of Article 2 of the
Genocide Convention, the 1996 Report on the Draft Code
Genocide Convention.
of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind of the
International Law Commission (ILC), the International
The “Intent to Destroy” Requirement of Genocide (Mens Rea)
Court of Justice’s advisory opinion, the Legality of the Threat
The essence of genocide is, however, not the actual
or Use of Nuclear Weapons, as well as relevant case law of the
destruction of the group, but the intent to destroy it as
ICTR. The Trial Chamber found that the definition of the
such, i.e., the mens rea of the offense. Although forced relocrime of genocide required a “specific intent,” i.e., that
cation may have the effect of causing the extinction of a
continued on next page
group, it may not qualify as genocide under the definition
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characterized the factual situation as genocidal, despite
the fact that the Paraguayan Defense Minister denied the
genocide encompasses only acts committed with the goal of
requisite genocidal intent existed.
destroying all or part of the group.
Indeed, governments often use development-induced disIn its 1997 decision Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., the
placement as a means of undermining disfavored minority
United States District Court for the Eastern District of
cultures. Indigenous Peoples living in remote areas of a
Louisiana adopted the same interpretation. This case
country are particularly vulnerable to practices of “ethnically
addressed the claim of genocide by an Indonesian citizen
targeted development” because they are often perceived as
and leader of the Amungme tribe against Freeport, an
“primitive.” In practice, the real challenge will be to find an
American corporation that owned a subsidiary which oper“intent” to extinguish the resettled group qua group. How
ated open-pit copper, gold, and silver mines in Indonesia.
can intent, for example, be proved if a development-induced
The plaintiff alleged that Freeport’s conduct resulted in the
relocation lacks an openly declared objective to destroy
displacement, relocation, and “purposeful, deliberate, conthe group in its collective sense?
trived and planned demise of a
Commentators have drawn a
culture of indigenous people.” In
parallel to race discrimination
interpreting genocide as a specific
claims, and have argued that plainThe question remains whether the
intent offense, the court in Beanal
tiffs probably must prove intent
prevailing interpretation of genocide as a
relied on the 1995 decision of the
indirectly, by inferences from the
United States Court of Appeals,
actions of the government. Both
specific intent crime must necessarily be
Kadic v. Karadzic, which upheld
the ICTY and the ICTR have folfollowed. In considering the object and
that specific intent was an element
lowed similar approaches, and
purpose of the Genocide Convention, an
of genocide. The Beanal court
have asserted that the intent to
found that a claim of genocide
argument could be made both for the
destroy a protected group can be
was not sufficiently clear and that
derived from certain facts, such
specific intent interpretation, and for the
the plaintiff should therefore be
as political speeches or plans, or
broad interpretation of the intent
given the opportunity to make a
other methods or actions which
requirement of Article 2.
more definite statement clarifying
are not part of the genocide itself,
whether he meant that Freeport
but constitute part of the attack on
was destroying the Amungme culthe group, or the objective cirture, or whether Freeport was committing acts with the
cumstances or consequences of an act. One would, thereintent to destroy the Amungme group.
fore, have to study the facts closely to discover an implicit
The question remains whether the prevailing interpregenocidal intent. In cases in which a long-term state policy
tation of genocide as a specific intent crime must necessarily
of annihilating a particular minority group exists, and in
be followed. In considering the object and purpose of the
which forced relocations support the country’s general
Genocide Convention, an argument could be made both
policy of repression toward a minority community, or in
for the specific intent interpretation, and for the broad
which a country’s developmental agenda is specifically and
interpretation of the intent requirement of Article 2. The
knowingly tailored toward the destruction, developmentInternational Court of Justice observed in its 1951 advisory
induced forced resettlement could merit the characterizaopinion on Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and
tion of genocide.
Punishment of Genocide, that the Genocide Convention’s
Proving intent, even if indirectly, will be difficult unless
object and purpose is “to safeguard the very existence of cera pattern of rights violations with the foreseeable result of
tain human groups.” If the Convention seeks to protect
group destruction exists. In sum, according to the prevailhuman groups’ right to existence, however, in the interest
ing interpretation of genocidal intent, the incident of
of the most effective protection of minority groups from a
forcible dislocation alone will not suffice to establish that
rights-based approach, one might make a case for a broad
genocide has been committed, even if the displacement can
interpretation of genocidal intent.
be reasonably expected to result in the extinction of the relocated group. Rather, further evidence would be necessary
Proving Specific Intent
to prove that a state, in forcefully relocating a particular
Even if specific intent were the correct standard of genogroup, did not only want to take the land of the people, but
cidal intent, however, governments cannot escape charges
destroy the people as such.
for “development genocide” simply by invoking the absence
of intent to destroy the relocated group as a separate and
The Prohibition under International Law of Cultural Genocide
distinct entity. In cases in which ethnic and racial minori(Ethnocide)
ties and indigenous groups are forcibly resettled in order
Forced resettlement might fall short of interfering with
to free their traditional land for economic development, the
a group’s physical survival, but may still undermine its culpurpose of the displacement might be to further economic
tural survival. Although physical destruction is the most
development. A project may, however, have more than one
obvious method to extinguish a group, one may, as has been
purpose, as demonstrated by the actions taken against
conceded by the Trial Chamber of the ICTY in the Krstic case
Paraguay’s Northern Aché population between 1962 and
“also conceive of destroying a group through purposeful
1972. In this case, fifty percent of the Aché population was
continued on next page
killed to make way for development projects. Scholars have
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an indigenous group.
To date, no single human or minority rights treaty exists
eradication of its culture and identity resulting in the evenwhich explicitly prohibits cultural genocide or ethnocide.
tual extinction of the group as an entity distinct from the
The lack of a specific treaty does not mean that international
remainder of the community.” Development-induced forced
human rights law currently fails to protect against the culrelocations often cause foreseeable, irreparable harm to the
tural destruction of minority groups. The prohibition of culcultures of peoples whose religious, economic, or social practural genocide is encompassed in the right of members of
tices, traditions, and norms are based on the land from which
a minority group to culture as protected, in particular, in
they are dislocated. Displacement often results in the disArticle 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Politintegration of local cultures, the weakening of community
ical Rights (ICCPR). Logically, the destruction of a culture
institutions and social networks, and the dispersion of kin
is a violation of the right to culture.
groups, resulting in the cultural destruction of the affected
Controversy remains, however, as to whether the right to
group. The question therefore arises, whether in such cases
enjoy one’s own culture implies that a minority communithe displaced people can make out a claim for genocide proty’s traditional way of life must be preserved at all costs. Even
vided that the cultural destruction was intended.
among the members of the Human Rights Committee,
Some legal scholars argue that, although the framers of the
opinions diverge on this question.
Genocide Convention considered
This disparity is illustrated by the
and then expressly rejected cultural
Regardless of the difficulty of proving the
individual opinion of Committee
genocide, the notion of genocide
member Nisuke Ando in B. Omimens rea requirement of the international
today covers not only the physical or
nayak and Members of the Lubicon
crime of genocide, a rights-based approach
material eradication of a group, but
Lake Band v. Canada. In their comto the protection against threats to the
also the cultural destruction of a
munication, members of the Lubigroup. In this context, one might
con Lake Band argued that the
cultural survival of minority groups
argue that the prohibition of culprovince of Alberta had allowed
appears to be more suitable than a
tural genocide has at least ascended
private oil and gas exploration
criminal law approach.
to the level of customary internaactivities to threaten their way of
tional law. A narrow definition of
life. The violation was manifested
genocide excluding the cultural destruction of a group still preby the threat of destruction of the band’s economic base and
vails, however. In the Krstic case, the Trial Chamber conthe continuity of its indigenous traditions and practices, thus
cluded that “an enterprise attacking only the cultural or sociendangering the group’s survival as a people. Whereas the
ological characteristics of a human group in order to annihilate
Committee found a violation of Article 27, Committee
these elements which give to that group its own identity dismember Ando argued in his individual opinion that “the
tinct from the rest of the community would not fall under the
right to enjoy one’s own culture should not be understood
definition of genocide.” Similarly, in Beanal, the court held that
to imply that the band’s traditional way of life must be pregenocide included deliberate acts which inflict on the group
served intact at all costs. Past history of mankind bears out
conditions of life “calculated to bring about its physical destructhat technical development has brought about various
tion,” but did not purport to include acts which cause “dischanges to existing ways of life and thus affected a culture
placement” and “relocation” absent any physical destruction.
sustained thereon. Indeed, outright refusal by a group in
Regardless of the difficulty of proving the mens rea requirea given society to change its traditional way of life may
ment of the international crime of genocide, a rights-based
hamper the economic development of the society as a
approach to the protection against threats to the cultural
whole.” A decade later, the Committee in its considerasurvival of minority groups appears to be more suitable
tions regarding the communication Länsman et al. v. Finland
than a criminal law approach. The framers of the Genocide
argued that although a state may understandably wish to
Convention argued in a rights-based direction, and decided
encourage development, measures whose impact amount
to leave the explicit prohibition of cultural genocide to
to a denial of the right of a member of a minority to enjoy
future human rights and minority rights protections. In past
his or her culture would not be compatible with the obligdecades, significant advances had been made in the develations under Article 27. The Committee contended, howopment of the law on Indigenous Peoples’ rights, most
ever, that measures having a limited impact on the way of
noteworthy through the standard-setting activities of the UN
life of persons belonging to a minority would not necessarily
and the Organization of American States (OAS). For examamount to a denial of the right to culture under Article 27.
ple, Article 7 of the 1993 UN Draft Declaration on the
Applying this argument to cases of development-induced disRights of Indigenous Peoples contains the explicit lanplacement, one would have to conclude that the right to culguage, “collective and individual right not to be subjected
tural integrity as protected under Article 27 of the ICCPR
to ethnocide and cultural genocide.” The Proposed Amercurtails forced relocations which prevent the relocated
ican Declaration on the Right of Indigenous Peoples confrom sustaining their cultural life.
tains an explicit prohibition of forced assimilation, the
To date, the Human Rights Committee has not yet
right to cultural integrity, and a prohibition of arbitrary transdecided a case of forced relocation as such. The Commitfer or relocation of Indigenous Peoples without their free
tee’s concluding observations with regard to Chile’s State
and informed consent. Both drafts reflect growing awareReport of 1999, indicate, however, which standard the
ness for the special needs of protection of indigenous and
Committee is likely to use in such cases. In the observations,
tribal peoples against activities that may result in the destruction of the culture or the possibility of the extermination of
continued on page 21
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ecution because the TRC fosters the children’s total rehabilitation and social reintegration in accordance with Sierra
Leone’s obligation to “take all appropriate measures to promote physical and psychological recovery and social reintegration of a child victim of . . . armed conflict,” according
to Article 39 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC). The child combatant’s unique position of first victim
and then victimizer requires a special accountability mechanism such as the TRC. Such an approach also is consistent
with Article 40.3 of the CRC, which emphasizes the importance of using alternatives to judicial proceedings when
dealing with children who have violated the law, provided that
human rights and legal safeguards are respected.
In pursuing the difficult task of determining the accountability of a child combatant, many experts argue that accountability would best be established through a non-punitive truth
telling process, a form of catharsis allowing the victim and
perpetrator to heal emotionally and psychologically. Experts
argue also that it would be unfair to hold children to the same
standards of criminal liability as adults who orchestrated armed
attacks and forced abductions of children. As such, truth
telling before the TRC complies with international human
rights standards in the CRC, and appears to be the most effective accountability mechanism for children.
Displacement, continued from page 17

the Committee raised concerns about hydroelectric and
other development projects that might affect the way of life
and the rights of persons belonging to the Mapuche and
other indigenous communities, and concluded that “relocation and compensation may not be appropriate in order
to comply with article 27 of the Covenant,” and that “when
planning actions that affect members of indigenous communities, the State party must pay primary attention to the
sustainability of the indigenous culture and way of life and
to the participation of members of indigenous communities in decisions that affect them.”
Conclusion
It is questionable whether an overemphasis on the drafting history of the Genocide Convention serves the Convention’s purpose to protect the right to existence of minority groups. When interpreting genocide, should one be
guided by the realization that international law is not static,
but an evolving body of standards and directives that must
be interpreted and applied in a contemporaneous fashion?
Despite the encouragement engendered by the emerging
genocide approach toward development-induced displacement, however, one must certainly be careful not to stretch
the law to make it fit one’s vision. Hence, the crucial question to be answered is whether the concept of genocide is
adequate to deal with forced relocations in the context of
development projects that result in both the physical and cultural extinction of an ethnic and racial minority and indigenous group. The concept of genocide is not quite adequate
to deal with the destructive consequences of developmentinduced displacement of minority communities. In most
cases, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to prove that
forced dislocations in the context of a development project,
including those leading to the physical or cultural destruc-

Conclusion
The moral dilemma of holding juvenile offenders accountable for war crimes is addressed collaboratively by the Special Court and the TRC. The Special Court focuses on prosecuting war criminals with the greatest responsibility, while
the TRC focuses on fostering national peace and reconciliation. There is strong support from Sierra Leone for the prosecution of juvenile offenders in order to comply with the
international obligation to punish perpetrators of human
rights and humanitarian law violations. The lack of prosecution, some argue, could perpetuate impunity and pose a
risk of similar abuses recurring in the future. In light of the
special circumstances of the forcibly recruited child soldier,
however, it appears that the RUF adult leaders primarily
qualify as “individuals with the greatest responsibility,” and
should therefore be targeted for prosecution. The unique
position of the child combatant, first victim then perpetrator, would best be served by truth telling before the TRC to
facilitate effective social rehabilitation and reintegration.
At the same time, the TRC promotes national reconciliation,
which is essential for the population to heal after nine years
of armed conflict. 
* Ismene Zarifis is a J.D. candidate at the Washington College of
Law and a staff writer for the Human Rights Brief.

tion of a minority group, constitute genocide within the
meaning of the Genocide Convention.
The case law of the international criminal tribunals does
not support the application of the concept of genocide to
development-induced displacement either. The factual situations the tribunals have dealt with were fundamentally different from most cases of forced relocations in the context
of development projects. In the cases before the tribunals,
states and individuals accused of having committed the
crime of genocide set out to exterminate the members of the
particular victim groups simply on the grounds of their ethnic difference. Yet to prove that a government intentionally
uses development-induced displacement as a means to extinguish a minority group qua group will be a difficult, if not
impossible, endeavor. Whether forced relocations in the
context of development projects are referred to as a “soft
form” or “special category” of genocide, the apparently
insurmountable hurdle of establishing the elements of genocide remains. One may argue that in cases in which an individual is held liable for the tort of genocide and not the crime,
that in these cases the intent requirement might be less
stringent. With regard to protection against cultural genocide or ethnocide, it remains to be seen whether the proposed declarations by the UN and the OAS on Indigenous
Peoples’ Rights, once adopted, will be used as standards
against which the practice of ethnically targeted development
in general, and of development-induced displacement of
minority communities in particular, are measured. 
* Stefanie Ricarda Roos, M.A.L.D. (Tufts University), is a visiting research scholar at the Washington College of Law and a
Ph.D. candidate in international law/international human rights
law at the Faculty of Law at Bonn University in Germany. This
piece is part of an ongoing research project. The author may be contacted at ricardaroos@hotmail.com.
21

